SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.
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Basis Risk CarryFwd Paid.
GSAMP Trust 2006-S3
The story looked under the cover of one particularly rotten mortgage bond underwritten by Goldman. Fortune Magazine — It’s getting hard to wrap your brain around subprime mortgages, Wall Street’s fancy name for junk home loans.
As a second-mortgage holder, GSAMP couldn’t foreclose on deadbeats unless the first-mortgage holder also foreclosed. There are trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities in the world for the same reason that Tyson Foods offers you chicken pieces rather than insisting you buy an entire bird.
Gsamp Trust He4, Author at Last10K
Average Loss Severity Approximation over period between nth month and mth month: Next Pass Through Rate. Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: Interested in legs, thighs, giblets, the heart? It’s all in the math – and the assumptions about how borrowers will behave. Loss Severity Approximation for current period: Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: How does toxic waste get distilled into spring water?
Remember that we’re dealing with securities, not actual loans. As a result, the X tranche, both B tranches, and the four bottom M tranches have been wiped out, and M-3 is being chewed up like a frame house with termites.
Current Scheduled Payments 8 Month Prior. Way too late, as usual, regulators and lenders began imposing higher credit standards. It said in a recent SEC filing, “Although we recognized significant losses on our non-prime mortgage loans and securities, those losses were more than offset by gains on short mortgage positions. This issue, which is backed by ultra-risky second-mortgage loans, contains all the elements that facilitated the housing bubble and bust.
The first is to do what we did: Check out one of these jewels on a Bloomberg machine, and the price chart looks like something falling off a cliff.
Current Scheduled Payments 11 Month Prior. After paying the people who collected the payments and handled all the other paperwork, the GSAMP Trust had ten percentage points left.
That’s because the models were based on recent performances of junk-mortgage borrowers, who hadn’t defaulted much until last year thanks to the housing bubble. Someone wants a safe, relatively low-interest, short-term security?
Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk (Fortune, ) | Fortune
It was go-go finance, very 21st century. First, you have to pay at least some attention to all those “risk factors” that issuers forever warn you about – especially when you’re dealing with a whole new thing like junk mortgages issued en masse instead of by specialists. July 25, Distribution. Alas, almost everyone involved in this duck-feeding deal has had a foul experience.
Junk mortgages under the microscope
More than a third of the loans were in California, then a hot market. Why it’s time for investors to go on defense Premarket: As they say on the Street, “When the ducks quack, trudt them.
Goldman’s profits came from hedging the trusst securities it keeps 20006-s3 inventory in order to make trading markets. It gets first dibs on principal paydowns from regular monthly payments, refinancings, and borrowers paying off their loans because they’re selling their homes. That prompted Fortune to ask the firm to explain to us how it had managed to come out ahead while so many of its mortgage-backed customers were getting stomped.
Average SDA Approximation over period between the nth month and mth month: Similarly, Wall Street carves mortgages into tranches because it can get more for the pieces than it would get for whole mortgages. Finally, Goldman sold two non-investment-grade tranches.
And no one knows whether borrowers’ incomes or assets bore any serious relationship to what they told the mortgage lenders.
You can see why borrowers lined up for the loans, even though they carried high interest rates. Photograph by Paulo Fridman. The first is to do what we did: